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The Just Compensation Clause "was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."1
I. INTRODUCTION
The plight of endangered species is conveyed to the American public
daily through the news media. One reads of beleaguered owls as they lose
their old-growth forest nesting areas or of a three-inch fish, the delta smelt,
competing against thirsty Southern Californians for water rights. It is made
apparent in these news reports that many species are facing serious threats
to their survival. 2 Increasingly, however, private property owners feel as
beleaguered and threatened as the rare species finding habitat on their land.
Examples abound, usually in the western United States, of property
owners adversely affected by species protection. Native Americans were
recently prevented from farming their fields because an endangered rodent,
the Stephens' kangaroo rat, had been found on their reservation in southern
California. Now, these American Indians, who have been planting the same
acreage for over thirty years, wonder how they will make their living. 3 A
family of five was affected by the Stephens' kangaroo rat after they left
Los Angeles to escape the pressures of the city. Now living in a more rural
area of California, the family expected to expand their one-bedroom home
to accommodate the size of their family. After the Stephens' kangaroo rat
was listed as endangered, however, they found themselves trapped by the
animal, neither able to build a larger house nor to sell their affected
property. 4
A battle is brewing between the economic interests of property owners
and the environmental goals of those seeking to promote species
* The author would like to thank Hank Hankla and Dave Schroeder for their
invaluable assistance, comments, and ideas.
I Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
2 BALANCING ON THE BRINK OF ExTINCrION (Kathryn Kohm ed., 1991).
3 Gail Wesson, Tribal Farmer Warned About K-rat, PREss-ENTERPRISE
(Riverside, Cal.), Nov. 26, 1992, at B1.
4 Juan C. Arancibia, Group Forming to Fight Restrictions, PRESS-ENTERPRISE
(Riverside, Cal.), July 24, 1992, at B2.
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preservation. These extremely political and emotionally charged disputes5
will become worse before they are resolved. As the 103rd United States
Congress draws to a close, it is extremely doubtful that any serious
environmental solutions are forthcoming. Apparently it will be left to
future Congresses to deal with these timely environmental issues. 6 The
next Congress should seize the opportunity to prevent future conflicts by
reconciling the dual objectives of biological diversity and the protection of
private property rights.
This Comment examines the legal issues surrounding the current state
of takings law and discusses how recent court decisions affect the federal
regulation of endangered and threatened species. Part Two outlines the
characteristics of the Endangered Species Act as well as the principle
arising out of the Fifth Amendment principle that compensation must
accompany a "taking" of property. Part Three considers what
circumstances must arise for the Endangered Species Act to effect a
compensable taking of property. Part Four explains why the Endangered
Species Act is more likely to result in a taking of property than other
environmental laws. Past proposals to alleviate burdens on species and
property owners will be examined. Part Five concludes that a balanced
approach to species preservation is needed in the short term. In the long
term, protection of entire ecosystems may alleviate the takings dilemma.
II. DIVERGENT PRINCIPLES:
SPECIES PROTECTION VS. PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. The Endangered Species Act
Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)7 to
provide a framework for identifying and protecting endangered and
threatened animal and plant species. 8 An important part of the Act's goal is
5 Lou Cannon, Saw-Toothed Despair Leaves Mark on Northwestern Loggers,
WAsH. PosT, July 27, 1991, at A3 (telling the loggers' story of despair, particularly
that of a young logger who committed suicide).
6 Growing dissension and dissatisfaction with the Clinton Administration within
the ranks of environmental activists is evident in recent efforts to pull all
environmental legislation out of circulation and consideration by the 103rd Congress.
See Memorandum from Erik Olson, of the National Resource Defense Council to
other environmental lobbyists March 4, 1994 (Memorandum on file with the Ohio
State Law Journal).
7 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
8 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988).
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to protect entire ecosystems. 9 This aim is met, in part, by efforts to
conserve individual species. This ecosystem protection also includes the
preservation of sensitive habitats. The objectives of the Act are
implemented jointly by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) under the jurisdiction of the
U.S. Department of the Interior and U.S. Department of Commerce,
respectively. Despite this shared jurisdiction, the law assigns the major
role of enforcement to the Secretary of the Interior.10 Once the Secretary
from either department initiates the process of listing a species, an
extensive series of procedural steps begins. This process of hearings and
intensive biological research seeks to provide adequate public notice and a
detailed collection of information. During this process the species under
study is termed a "candidate species." 11 If the Secretary then decides to list
a species as endangered or threatened, "critical habitat" must be designated
and recovery plans must be developed. 12
Due to the broad scope and strict enforcement of the ESA, some
commentators believe endangered species to be this country's most highly
protected natural resource. 13 When enacting the ESA, Congress intended to
protect endangered and threatened species at any cost.14 The original ESA
translated into a rigid regulation that prohibited the consideration of any
economic factors in the determination of when a species was endangered or
threatened and what remedial actions were necessary to protect that
species. 15 The legislative history makes it abundantly clear that Congress
was interested only in determining whether a species needed protection
from extinction. 16 As a result, the Secretary of Interior was directed to
9 1d.
10 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1988).
111d.
12 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A) (1988). An "endangered species" is one which is in
danger of extinction throughout all or a predominant portion of its range. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(6) (1988). A "threatened species" is a species likely to become an endangered
species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a major portion of its range. 16
U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1988).
13 George C. Coggins & Irma S. Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters in Pork
Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEo. L.J. 1433, 1496
(1982).
14 Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, wrote, "[tihe plain intent of
Congress in enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost." TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).
15 See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A) (1988).
16 See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 37, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 4-5 (1973).
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make his determinations in the listing process "solely" on the basis of the
best scientific and commercial data available. 17
Because the original ESA was considered too drastic, t 8 Congress
amended the Act slightly to change the process of designating critical
habitat. 19 Pursuant to these amendments, the species listing process
remains essentially the same, permitting only scientific data to be
considered. Since 1978, however, the Secretary has also been required to
consider the economic impact of critical habitat designation in addition to
scientific data.20 This attention to economic considerations allows the
Secretary to "exclude any area from critical habitat if he determines that
the benefits of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area
as part of the critical habitat .... "21 Regardless of the economic impact,
however, the ESA prohibits the exclusion of the critical habitat if the
Secretary determines on the basis of biological factors that such exclusion
would result in the extinction of the species. 22
Few can dispute the severe impact of land development upon the
survival and existence of many plant and animal species.2 3 Given the vast
number of species, the impact of development is astounding. Some
biologists estimate that the number of species reaches into the tens of
17 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); see also James C. Kilbourne, The
Endangered Species Act Under the Microscope: A Closeup Look from a Litigator's
Perspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499, 505 (1991) (explaining that Congress added the word
"solely" in 1982 to preclude the consideration of any nonbiological factors during the
listing process).
18 Upon finding that various species had "been rendered extinct as a consequence
of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and
conservation," the ESA was an extremely strict statute. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a).
Consequently, courts were willing to strictly enforce the statute. See, e.g., TVA v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Therefore, results under the Act were often harsh, and
Congress subsequently amended the Act several times to take consideration of
economic factors in specific situations. The primary situation in which the Secretary
may consider economic factors occurs when designating critical habitat. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(b)(2).
19 Kilbourne, supra note 17, at 510.
20 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1988).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Craig A. Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats: The Emerging
Impact of the Endangered Species Act on Land Use Development, 10 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 1 (1991) (acknowledging that protecting endangered species is important, but
arguing for more balancing between land-use development and environmental
policies).
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millions. 24 Already 750 endangered and threatened species are listed, and
the FWS intends to add nearly one hundred additional species. 25 The
growing challenge for government agencies, municipalities, and private
property owners is to find a way to comply with the ESA in the face of
increasing development pressures. 26
B. Property Rights
The U.S. Constitution guarantees that private property will not be
taken for public use without just compensation.2 7 Despite this country's
rich history of protection of property rights, the issue of determining when
a taking occurs continues to be an area of confusion within the courts. 28
Several recent takings cases concern land use regulations aimed at
protecting the environment. 29 Despite these recent cases, however, the
application of the ESA to private real property rights has yet to be
specifically addressed by the courts. 30
24 Approximately 1.4 million species have been discovered and named. Estimates
of total species on Earth range between 3 million and 30 million. Brian Mannix, The
Origin of Endangered Species and the Descent of Man, AM. ENTERPRIsE, Nov./Dec.
1992, at 57-59.
25 The Audubon Society recently sued the U.S. Department of the Interior and
successfully argued that the Secretary must list 400 species within the next 5 years.
26 Coggins & Russell, supra note 13, at 1433 (accurately predicting that
regulations aimed at protecting plant and animal species could act to limit land use
planning in the United States).
27 U.S. CoNST. amend. V. Application of the takings provision to the individual
states occurred after the provision was incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
28 "The question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty." Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978).
29 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (concerning
preservation of beachfront property from erosion and development); Ciampitti v.
United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991) (concerning the implementation of the Clean
Water Act to preserve wetlands); Florida Rock Indus. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161
(1990); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990).
30 Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114
(1989), is the only case thus far to consider the issue of a taking of property as a result
of the Endangered Species Act. After grizzly bears killed 20 of Christy's sheep, the
rancher shot one of the bears to protect his remaining livestock. Because the grizzly
bear is an endangered species, Christy was fined for violating the ESA. Christy
claimed that he was rightfully defending his property and was entitled to federal
compensation for loss of the sheep as a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment.
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A government agency may "take" property under its power of eminent
domain. 31 It is this power with which the government has created
"highway systems, built hospitals and dams, and preserved wilderness
areas as national parks. "32 Although takings may occur without an owner's
consent, 33 compensation is required under the Fifth Amendment guarantee
of just compensation to landowners whose property is taken for public
purposes. 34 When a public benefit is gained from a taking, the public is
expected to compensate the landowner for her loss.35
The constitutional requirement that just compensation must accompany
government takings is closely guarded in this country. 36 There is,
however, a well established deviation from the compensation rule known as
the "nuisance exception," first recognized by the Supreme Court in Mugler
v. Kansas.37 The Mugler opinion established that if a state could show that
The Ninth Circuit held that no taking of property had occurred and the U.S. Supreme
Court denied certiorari. Id.
31 "The right of eminent domain is the right of the state, through its regular
organization, to reassert, either temporarily or permanently, its dominion over any
portion of the soil of the state on account of public exigency and for the public good."
BLACK'S LAW DIcrIoNARY 523 (6th ed. 1990).
32 ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, IN OUR DEFENSE: THE BILL OF
RIGHTS IN ACrION 192 (1991).
33 ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 510 (1984). See also
ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 32, at 189-205 (discussing Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W. 2d 455 (Mich. 1981), in which
the city of Detroit successfully evicted homeowners unwilling to leave their
neighborhood, compensated the previous landowners, and then contracted with
General Motors to build an auto assembly factory on the property). See generally
Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 (1964).
34 "[Tihis Court has recognized that the 'Fifth Amendment's guarantee ... [is]
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."' Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978) (citing Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
35 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
36 In James Madison's words: "The rights of property are committed into the
same hands with the personal rights" and "[g]overnment is instituted no less for the
protection of the property than of the persons of individuals. . . ." THE FEDERALiST
No. 54, at 339 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
37 123 U.S. 623 (1887). In Mugler, the operations in a residential area of a
Kansas distiller were found to be a public harm, and consequently:
[tihe power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their
property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the
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it was prohibiting a use of land found to be "injurious to the health,
morals, or safety of the community," 38 a compensable taking had not
occurred.39 The Supreme Court continued to apply the nuisance exception
until 1922 when it struck down an ordinance forbidding coal mining in
certain areas. 40 Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, stated for the first
time that "if regulation goes too far" it will be recognized as a
compensable taking.41
In addition to a physical taking of property, it is now commonly
recognized that regulatory takings of property are possible.42 Until
recently, however, it was not clear how far a regulation had to go before a
compensable taking occurred.43 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
public, is not-and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized
society, cannot be-burdened with the condition that the State must compensate
such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their
not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the
community.
Id. at 669.
38 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 (1987).
The nuisance exception addresses an important concept of property law in our society:
The principle that one may not use her property in a manner that will create a public
nuisance to others. As the Keystone Court reiterated, "it is hard to imagine a different
rule that would be consistent with the maxim 'sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas' (use
your own property in such manner as not to injure that of another)." Id. at n.22.
3 9 Mugler, 123 U.S. 623.
40 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
41 Id. at 415.
42 "Thus, government action that works a taking of property rights necessarily
implicates the 'constitutional obligation to pay just compensation."' First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)
(quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). In this case, state
regulations prevented the landowner from rebuilding its church facilities in a
floodplain. No physical occupation of the land occurred, yet the Court stated
unequivocally that a regulatory taking had taken place and that monetary
compensation was warranted. See also Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 ("if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking").
43 "[This Court has generally 'been unable to develop any "set formula" for
determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries caused by
public action be compensated by the government. . . ."' Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)); see also, Gilbert L. Finnell, Jr., Public Access to Coastal
Public Properly: Judicial Theories and the Taking Issue, 67 N.C. L. REV. 627 (1989)
(stating that determining when a regulation goes too far remains one of the most
1994]
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Council,44 the Supreme Court further defined the requirements necessary to
establish such a regulatory taking. 45 In Lucas, the Court identified two
discrete categories of regulatory takings that would result in a compensable
taking.46 If either of these two situations arises from a regulation, a per se
taking has occurred and compensation is required, regardless of the
regulation's intent or importance. 47
1. Physical Invasion
The first category of regulatory takings consists of those regulations
that "compel the property owner to suffer a physical 'invasion' of his
property. 48 According to the Court, "no matter how minute the intrusion,
and no matter how weighty the public purpose behind it, we have required
compensation." 49 This class of regulatory takings applies to such situations
as government-mandated beachfront easements5" and cable line
installations. 51 In each of these cases, a regulation requiring a physical
intrusion onto an owner's property resulted in a taking of property.
2. Complete Economic Loss
The second category of regulatory takings consists of those regulations
that deny a property owner all economically beneficial or productive use of
her land. 52 Although the Supreme Court claimed it was not creating a
difficult issues in property law and advocating the use of the public trust doctrine in
determining when a taking has occurred); Linda A. Malone, The Coastal Zone
Management Act and the Takings Clause in the 1990's: Making the Case for Federal
Land Use to Preserve Coastal Areas, 62 U. CoLo. L. REv. 711 (1991) (stating that it
is very unclear how far a deprivation must go to be a taking).
44 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
45 Id. The Lucas majority defends its position by stating that it is merely applying
earlier takings law, not creating new exceptions, as Justice Blackmun argues in his
dissenting opinion. Id. at 2893 n.6.
46 Id. at 2893.
47 Id. According to the Court, when it finds that one of these "two discrete
categories of regulatory action" has affected private property, compensation is




50 Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
51 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
52 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. "As we have said on numerous occasions, the Fifth
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second classification of per se regulatory takings, Lucas marked the first
time that the Court clearly articulated and applied this rule. 53 The Lucas
Court avoided the difficulty of calculating complete economic loss of
property by adopting the state court's finding that the entire economic
value of the land had been destroyed. 54 In Lucas, the trial court found that
the property owner had suffered a loss of all economic value of his
beachfront property.5 5 The loss resulted from a state regulation that sought
to protect South Carolina's coastal areas from erosion and ecologically
detrimental development. 56 Regardless of the purpose behind the statute,
the Court found that the regulation completely destroyed the value of the
property and remanded to the state supreme court. 57 Thus, the Lucas Court
categorically held that complete destruction of the land's economic value
warranted compensation to the property owner. 58 According to the Lucas
Court, once it was determined that the regulation resulted in a complete
economic loss, it was no longer necessary to inquire into the public interest
at issue.59
The Lucas Court justified the harmful or noxious use analysis of
government regulation on property as a means of explaining the
permissible police power exercised in cases such as Mugler. The Court
reasoned that such earlier exercises of police power had caused a mere
reduction in the value of land rather than complete economic loss.6° One
exception to the categorical rule of Lucas was recognized by the Court "if
Amendment is violated when land-use regulation 'does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land."' Id.
at 2893-94 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
53 Previously, the Court advocated factual inquiries into several factors
accompanied takings analyses. Loss of economic viability was one of these factors,
along with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of the
governmental action. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S.
340, 349 (1986); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S 164, 175 (1979).
54 Justice Blackmun questioned this step by the Court. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2908
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("This finding is almost certainly erroneous.").
55 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890 (citing Application to Petition for Cert. 37).
56 1988 Beachfront Management Act, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -360
(Supp. 1991).
57 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901-02.
58 See Paul F. Haffner, Case Note, Regulatory Takings-A New Categorical Rule:
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 61 U. CN. L. REv. 1035 (1993)
(condemning the categorical rule and advocating a return to the case-by-case approach
to takings cases).59 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
60 Id. at 2898-99; see also Haffner, supra note 58, at 1044.
1994]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
the regulation simply affirmed what inhered in the background principles
of the state's property and nuisance law." 61 This exception prevents a
finding of a taking if a legitimate state interest (based on state property and
common law principles) exists.
III. APPLICATION OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
AND LUCAS TO THE ESA
In light of the Lucas opinion, it is helpful to examine the application of
takings law to difficult cases arising under the ESA. The question that
courts will likely struggle with is whether the ESA may result in a
compensable regulatory taking of property when a landowner's property is
designated as critical habitat therefore precluding any planned development
on that land. Pursuant to Lucas, one must ask whether the federal
regulation evokes either a physical invasion of the property or a complete
loss of all economic viability. As examined earlier, either of these
categories results in a per se regulatory taking. 62 The only time such a
regulatory taking will not require compensation to the private property
owner is when the state actor is pursuing a legitimate state interest. The
requisite legitimate state interest arises only when a traditional public
nuisance is being prevented. The question then becomes whether the ESA
acts to prevent a traditional public nuisance as interpreted by the Supreme
Court.
A. Does the ESA Result in a Physical Invasion?
If a regulation results in a physical invasion upon private property, the
owner is entitled to compensation from the government. 63 The primary
issue in determining whether an ESA designation of critical habitat results
in a physical invasion is not necessarily whether the species in question
occupies the property, but whether the occupation by the species, and the
resulting regulatory treatment of species habitated land, qualifies as an
"invasion" of that property. Some would argue that a protected species is
actually a third party that is given the unrestricted right to occupy private
property as a result of government regulation.64 Such an opinion is
61 Haffner, supra note 58, at 1045; see also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
62 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
63 See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text; see also Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
64 See Geoffrey L. Harrison, Comment, The Endangered Species Act and Ursine
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defeated, however, by the Supreme Court's decision in Toomer v.
Witsell,65 holding that the government acts as a trustee of fish and game
that are the common property of all citizens of the governmental unit.66
Under this view, the government exercises ownership for the benefit of its
citizens. 67 It follows from such an interpretation that the government is
responsible for the actions of the animal, and it is as if the government
itself physically invaded the property. Other courts have disagreed,
however, holding that the United States doesn't "own" the wild animals it
protects through statutes such as the ESA. 68 In Christy v. Hodel,69 the
leading case in this area, a rancher was severely fined for defending his
livestock against hungry grizzly bears. 70 Because grizzlies are listed as an
endangered species, the rancher was found in violation of the ESA. In
Christy, the Ninth Circuit held that because the United States does not own
and cannot control the conduct of protected species, it is not responsible
for their actions.71 Despite a vigorous dissent by Justice White, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 72 Consequently, it is unlikely that the
Court would support a theory of physical invasion on the part of the
protected species.
B. Does the ESA Result in Complete Economic Loss?
A much stronger argument can be made that ESA designations of
critical habitat impact a property owner so severely that all economic value
in the property is destroyed and compensation is required. To determine
Usurpations: A Grizzly Tale of Two Takings, 58 U. C. L. REv. 1101 (1991).
65 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
66 Id. at 399-403.
67 Id.
68 Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114
(1989).
69 Id.
70 After losing 20 sheep worth at least $1,200 to the grizzly bears, the rancher
shot one of the bears and was fined $2,500 by the FWS. Id. at 1326-27; see also
Lauri Alsup, Comment, The Right to Protect Property, 21 ENVTL. L. 209 (1991);
Harrison, supra note 64.
71 In his dissent, Justice White pointed out that if the federal government had
authorized park rangers to feed protected grizzlies with the plaintiff's livestock, the
result would be a taking that warranted compensation. Therefore, he argued, a
regulation that protects the bears, allows them to prey on livestock, and prohibits the
rancher from any action to protect his property is essentially the same situation.
Christy, 490 U.S. at 1115 (White, J., dissenting).
72 Christy, 490 U.S. 1114.
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when all economic value has been taken, the court must first know the
limit of the property interest. 73
1. Cumbersome Permitting Procedures Attempt
to Accommodate Development Pressures
Property owners in parts of the country such as the southwestern
United States owned their land long before species regulation began. These
states have come under increasing pressure to develop their open spaces
due to population increases and the favorable climate in these areas. As
development increases, more and more plant and animal species are being
adversely impacted and listed as endangered or threatened. As a result it is
not uncommon for certain Fish and Wildlife Service offices to threaten city
and county officials with citations for violating the ESA if they approve
development in sensitive habitat areas. 74 Local officials usually heed these
warnings to prevent being hit with civil and criminal penalties. 75
The 1982 amendments to the ESA sought to institute a permitting
process whereby limited development could take place and the ESA could
be applied to private property interests. The amendments authorized the
FWS to grant incidental taking permits under stringent restrictions. 76 A
successful "section 10(a)" permit now allows minimal harm, known as a
"taking" of the species, to come to a protected species when a conservation
plan satisfying the ESA is submitted. For example, one of the findings that
the FWS must make in granting such a permit is that the applicant will
minimize and mitigate the impact of the taking to the maximum extent
practicable. 77 Needless to say, defining what is meant by "maximum extent
73 Sax, supra note 33, at 152 n.8.
74 Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat
Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVrTL. L. 605,
613 (1991).
75 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1988); see also Maura Dolan, Nature at Risk in a Quiet
War, Los ANGELEs TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1992, at Al.
76 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1988). Requirements under the act include finding
that "the taking will be incidental, the applicant will to the maximum extent
practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such [a] taking;" adequate funding
will be provided by the applicant; and "the taking will not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild." 16 U.S.C.
§ 1539(a)(2)(B). This last requirement is especially difficult in light of the fact that,
once listed, an endangered species has never been removed from the list.
77 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1988). Although one commentator has
interpreted this language to mean that the FWS should balance the nature and benefits
of a proposed development project against the overwhelming cost of mitigation
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practicable" has been an uncertain task. The permitting process is a long
and protracted one, yet the property owner must pursue these
administrative avenues prior to making a constitutional claim for a taking
of property. 78 Until a property owner has exhausted all administrative
remedies, a court will not consider a takings case: 79
A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a
certain use of his or her property does not itself "take" the property in any
sense: after all, the very existence of a permit system implies that
permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use the property
as desired .... Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial
is to prevent "economically viable" use of the land in question can it be
said that a taking has occurred. 80
Even if such a permit is obtained, development may be conditioned on
the requirement that large tracts of land must be left pristine for protection
of the species. 8 If a permit is denied or if large tracts of property cannot
procedures, the Service has not used this interpretation. Arnold, supra note 23.
78 The Stephens' Kangaroo Rat Interim Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) in
Western Riverside County, California, has already taken over five years for.
processing and approval. An interim HCP is the equivalent of a temporary HCP. It is
hard to determine how much longer property owners must wait before a full HCP will
be completed. Thornton, supra note 74, at 634-35.
For a discussion of whether a temporary taking occurs when regulation adversely
affects property for a period of time, see Armour & Co., Inc. v. Inver Grove Heights,
2 F.3d 276 (8th Cir. 1993).
79 See Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473
U.S. 172, 186 (1985) ("[A] claim that the application of government regulations
effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged
with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the
application of the regulations to the property at issue."); see also MacDonald, Sommer
& Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 351-53 (1986). Lucas presents an unusual
situation in which the statute was amended to provide a permitting process after the
trial court had ruled on the case. Therefore, although Lucas's claim was technically
not a ripe one, the Supreme Court ruled on the case because the South Carolina
Supreme Court had decided the case on its merits. The actions of the South Carolina
Supreme Court essentially precluded Lucas from pursuing a permit process. Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2891-92.
80 United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985).
81 Takings issues continue to occupy the Court's docket. The Court recently
heard arguments in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437 (Or. 1993), cert. granted,
62 U.S.L.W. 3375 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1993) (No. 93-518), in which the city conditioned
a property owner's building permit upon a grant of land from that property owner.
Unless the landowner agreed to give the city a strip of land comprising 10% of her
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be developed, the essential question for the court then becomes whether the
regulatory restrictions have completely destroyed the property's economic
value. 82 Two factors have traditionally been considered in determining
whether the loss of property value is complete. One inquiry is whether the
property owner has lost all economic viability on the affected tracts of
land, or whether the individual has merely experienced a diminution of
value on the entire parcel of land as a whole.83 The second inquiry
affecting the court's determination of property loss centers on whether the
landowner's distinct investment-backed expectations have been destroyed.
2. The "Parcel as a Whole" Debate
The Supreme Court has "uniformly reject[ed] the proposition that
diminution in property value, standing alone, can establish a 'taking."' 8 4
Thus, "[o]ne must look to the character and extent of any interference with
property, she would not be permitted to enlarge her small business. George F. Will,
Extortionist City Government, WASH. POST, March 20, 1994, at C7. The city would
then use the "donated" land for a drainage greenspace and pedestrian/bicycle path
along a creek. 62 U.S.L.W. 15 (Oct. 26, 1993); Will, supra. The Court's opinion is
expected to determine what degree of relationship the city must demonstrate between
its approval of the requested building permit and the expected impacts of that land use.
The Court's opinion in Dolan could be extremely influential in the context of the ESA
as local and federal governments seek justification for species protection measures.
82 This is not to say that there must be loss of all economic value for a
compensable taking to occur. In Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, the court reads
Lucas as allowing the proposition that a landowner "need not suffer total deprivation
of economic value in order to have suffered a taking." If a complete economic loss
has not occurred, the court must "consider the other factors enunciated in Penn
Central." Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334, 1351 (1992), aff'd, 10
F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
83 As the Court in Lucas said:
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract
in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in
which the owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use of the
burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere
diminution in value of the tract as a whole.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992).
84 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (citing
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (75% diminution in
value as a result of zoning law) and Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)
(87.5 % diminution in value)).
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property rights whenever a taking claim is asserted." 85 Even if a party has
sustained some economic loss, the "proof of damage alone will not
necessarily prove a taking .... "86 In Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City, the Court articulated the concept of "parcel as a whole" in
order to measure the extent to which a property right allegedly has been
taken.8 7 The Penn Central Court rejected the argument that a servitude
exerted upon a particular parcel of land could constitute a taking of the
entire property of the claimant.8 8 Once the Court established a system of
particularized parcels of land, it could then justify a denial of compensable
taking in various other situations.
For example, a compensable taking did not occur when regulations
restricted subsurface coal mining in order to prevent subsidence damage on
the surface. 89 Although the regulation prohibited the claimant from mining
twenty-seven million tons of coal, the Court reasoned that the affected coal
made up only 2% of the entire property and thus did not constitute a
separate parcel of property. 9° Nor were claimants entitled to compensation
when either the subjacent or lateral development of particular parcels was
prohibited by law.91 Because courts have not yet considered the question of
economic loss of property resulting from an application of the ESA,92 it is
85 Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 716, 769 (1978).
86 Yazel v. United States, 118 Ct. Cl. 59, 72 (1950).
87 In articulating the "parcel as a whole" concept, the Court stated:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a
taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the
nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31.88 Id. at 130 n.27.
89 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987).
90 Id. "[Where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the
destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking because the aggregate must be
viewed in its entirety." Id. at 497 (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979)).
91 In Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 591 (1962), the Court did
not accept the property owner's argument that, because the most beneficial use of the
property was prohibited by statute, a compensable taking had occurred. Because the
property owner could find other uses for the property, the regulation was a valid
exercise of the town's police power. Id.; see also Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608
(1927) (upholding city ordinance restricting the construction and location of buildings
relative to the street).
92 In an effort to preserve critical Northern Spotted Owl habitat in the Pacific
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useful to examine cases dealing with related environmental statutes.
In comparable federal cases concerning the filling of wetlands,
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States93 and Florida Rock Industries v.
United States,94 the U.S. Court of Claims found that a compensable taking
occurred when fill permits were denied under the Clean Water Act. In both
cases, the court employed the parcel as a whole concept to hold that the
denial of fill permits for partial acreage of a larger tract of land constituted
a compensable taking.95 In reaching this conclusion, the court limited its
examination of economic loss only to that portion of property negatively
affected by the permit denial. Because the court determined that the
economic value of the affected portions of property was completely
destroyed, it found a complete economic loss. 96 Had the Court instead
assessed the entire tract of property, some of which was not affected by the
regulation, a different result would likely have occurred. This
interpretation of parcel as a whole has led some to predict that developers
will simply subdivide their land into smaller, more specialized parcels in
order to insure that complete loss of value occurs each time a permit is
denied. 97
Northwest, the U.S. Department of Interior (DOI) halted all logging on approximately
6.5 million acres of forested land in Washington, Oregon, and northern California.
DOI's original plan would have prohibited logging on 12 million acres of private and
federal lands. DOI eventually excluded the private property from the logging-
prohibited area to avoid Fifth Amendment takings claims. The effect of the prohibition
on the private land surely would have been to completely destroy its economic value.
Thus, DOI sidestepped thousands of takings claims that could have resulted in billions
of dollars in damages. Mannix, supra note 24, at 62.
93 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990).
94 21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990), vacated, No. 91-5156, 1994 WL 73987 (Fed. Cir. Mar.
10, 1994). The lower court's holding in Florida Rock may be short lived, however, as
the Federal Circuit, for the second time has vacated the Claims Court judgment. In its
opinion, the Federal Circuit "reject[s] the trial court's analysis that led to its
conclusion that all economically beneficial use of the land was taken by the
Government." Florida Rock, No. 91-5156, 1994 WL 73987, at *3.
95 Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 155; Florida Rock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 168.
96 In Florida Rock, the U.S. Court of Claims awarded plaintiff $1,029,000 for a
taking of 98 acres on a larger tract of 1,560 acres. Florida Rock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 176.
The Loveladies court awarded plaintiff $2,658,000 for a taking of 12.5 acres on a 51-
acre tract. Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 161. But see Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct.
310, 320 (1991) (interpreting parcel as a whole to include the entire tract of land,
rather than only the property negatively affected, consequently, only a diminution in
value had occurred- not a valid compensable taking).
97 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2919 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The Sierra Club and Audubon Society recently protested the
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In three related wetlands cases decided by the U.S. Court of Claims,
however, government regulation did not result in compensable takings. In
Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States,98 Jentgen v. United States99 and Dufau
v. United States,100 the Claims Court disallowed plaintiffs' claims for
compensation because some economic benefit was derived from the
property. In Tabb Lakes, the landowner contended that three of the lots in
a larger development constituted an entire parcel and that denial of a fill
permit for the three parcels resulted in complete economic loss. 101 The
court held, however, that even had it accepted the landowner's parcel as a
whole argument, substantial economic activity continued on the three lots
throughout the permitting process.10 2 Thus, any losses suffered by the
landowner amounted to no more than a mere diminution in value.1 03
Similarly, in Jentgen and Dufau the court found that a mere degree of
loss in the value of property is an "incident of ownership" and "cannot be
considered as a 'taking' in the constitutional sense."1°4 Of the eighty acres
classified as wetlands in Jentgen, the Corps offered a permit to develop
twenty acres. 105 Because the claimant's entire property holding of
approximately 100 acres retained some of its development value, the parcel
as a whole retained development potential.10 6 Likewise in Dufau, 70 acres
of the claimant's 112 acre parcel of land were designated as wetlands. 10 7
Although the landowner could not undertake any form of development over
half of his property, the parcel as a whole retained development
division of a large lumber company in which the original company would retain
11,000 acres of old-growth forest while a new subsidiary would own 200,000 acres of
second-growth forest. Environmental groups are worried that the new arrangement is
an attempt to insure maximum economic loss to the holder of the 11,000 acre old-
growth forest, thereby ensuring successful takings claim and a potentially costly legal
settlement in favor of the lumber company. Michael Parrish, Legal Strategy May
Boost Cost of Saving Timberlands, Los ANGELFS TIMs, Feb. 1, 1993, at B5.
98 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992), aff'd, 10 F.3d 796 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
99 228 Ct. Cl. 527 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
100 22 Cl. Ct. 156 (1990).
101 Tabb Lakes, 26 Cl. Ct. at 1348.
102 Id. at 1352.
103 Id.
104 Jentgen, 228 Ct. Cl. at 534; Dufau, 22 Ct. Cl. at 163 (quoting Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980) (citing Danworth v. United States, 308 U.S.
271, 285 (1939))).
105 Jentgen, 228 Ct. Cl. at 533.
10 6 Id.
107 Dufau, 22 Cl. Ct. at 162.
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potential.10 8 Thus, the court in both Jentgen and Dufau concluded that no
compensable taking had occurred.
3. Investment-Backed Expectations
The second inquiry used by the Court when determining whether the
impacted property has undergone a complete economic loss is the effect of
the regulation on the property owner's investment-backed expectations.10 9
The Lucas Court indicated that it considered the result in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City110  unsupportable on several
grounds. 111 First, Penn Central was found distinguishable because the loss
of value of one parcel of land was measured against the value of the
landowner's other holdings in the area. 112 Second, the Lucas Court found
inconsistencies in previous Court rulings. 113 Finally, the Lucas Court did
not have to decide the value of the economic loss because it summarily
accepted the trial court's finding of complete loss of economic value.114
Further inquiry into a landowner's expectations of the property is
necessary to determine the degree of loss resulting from a restrictive
regulation. 115 When a landowner seeks to assert a use of his property that
108 Id.
109 The Lucas Court admitted that the determination of economic loss could be a
difficult one and insinuated that a property owner's "reasonable expectations" might
be important in such a determination. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.
Ct. 2886, 2894 n.7 (1992).
110 Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.
111 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
112 Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.
113 The Court compared Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
in which a regulation adversely affecting coal extraction was held to effect a taking,
with Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), in which
a nearly identical regulation was held not to effect a taking. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894
n.7.
114 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. "In any event, we avoid th[e] difficulty [of
deciding economic loss] in the present case, since the 'interest in land' that Lucas has
pleaded (a fee simple interest) is an estate with a rich tradition of protection at
common law, and since the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas found that the
Beachfront Management Act left each of Lucas's beachfront lots without economic
value." See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
115 A landowner must show that the regulation interfered with "distinct
investment-backed expectations." Penn Cent. Tramp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978). According to the Ciampitti court, "the Supreme Court has made
it clear that the degree to which the claimant has advance notice of the government
action is relevant." Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 320 (1991).
[Vol. 55:453
SPECIES VS. PROPERTYRIGHTS
initially was not part of his original title, that landowner cannot complain
of a taking. 116 Thus, a property owner who acquires property already
burdened by ESA restrictions on development may have to forego a claim
for compensation. The FWS purposefully lists species as "candidates"
prior to listing them officially as threatened, or endangered. 117 By
providing for such a "prelisting" process, Congress sought to avoid future
conflict. 118 It is conceivable, therefore, that one who owns undeveloped
land or plans to buy such land may have an affirmative duty to research the
most recent FWS listing of candidate, threatened and endangered species
prior to the purchase of land or the formulation of development plans. 119 A
landowner may even have a duty to anticipate the listing of a species if
there is some evidence or special knowledge to warn the landowner of
future restrictions.1 20
C. Is the ESA a "Traditional Public Nuisance"?
When the ESA does affect the development rights of a property owner
but does not result in a complete loss of economic viability, the FWS has
an opportunity to prove that the ESA is in the public interest and that any
taking does not warrant compensation. The crucial question then is whether
enforcement of the ESA prevents a traditional public nuisance. In Lucas,
the Court laid down a very strict standard for a statute to qualify under the
nuisance exception of Mugler v. Kansas. Essentially, the Court requires a
showing that the regulation does no more than reproduce the result that
could have occurred through court actions instituted by adjacent
landowners or others with standing to bring an action under the state's
116 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
117 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1988).
118 Kilbourne, supra note 17, at 512 n.52.
119 "[Elveryone is charged with the knowledge of the United States Statutes at
large ...." Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-85 (1947); see
also Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1334, 1354 (1992), aff'd, 10 F.3d
796 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating that because procedures were available for obtaining
formal jurisdiction, the party "could have mitigated its own damage" and "should
have ascertained for... [itself]" whether its development activities were in line with
federal environmental regulations).
120 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7 (1992) (stating that the determination of
economic loss from an alleged taking may depend on "how the owner's reasonable
expectations have been shaped by... whether and to what degree the State's law has
accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in land" in
question).
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private nuisance laws.' 21 This narrow interpretation of the nuisance
exception was criticized by several Justices in Lucas who believed it would
prevent nuisance law from changing and adapting to evolving public
demands on municipalities and localities. 122
It is unlikely, in light of the Lucas opinion, that ESA protection of
endangered species will be sufficient to qualify under the traditional public
nuisance exception. Preservation goals under the ESA123 are similar to the
goals articulated in the Beachfront Management Act, 124 which was the
statute at issue in Lucas. In Lucas, the Court did not view the protection
goals of the Beachfront Management Act to qualify as a nuisance
exception.' 25 Although the goal of species preservation is logically
connected to the global environment and traditional issues of health and
welfare, it is unlikely that one neighbor could successfully sue another for
"taking" an endangered species under traditional public nuisance law. 126
IV. REVISIONS TO THE ESA ARE NECESSARY
It is apparent that Congress and the American public place a high value
upon the protection of endangered and threatened species of plants and
121 The regulation negatively affecting the land must arise out of "background
principles of the state's law of property and nuisance already place[d] upon land
ownership." Id. at 2900.
122 Justice Kennedy believes that the state should be permitted to go beyond the
traditional common law of nuisance in regulating land. He believes that property law
is not static, that changing circumstances must be considered, and therefore protection
of coastal areas might be important enough for the state to regulate without
compensation. Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Stevens views the
majority as unwisely "arresting the development of the common law." Id. at 2921
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
123 See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) for the codified purpose of the ESA.
124 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -360 (Supp. 1991).
125 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. ("[It seems unlikely that common-law principles
would have prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on
petitioner's land; they rarely support prohibition of the 'essential use' of land.")
(quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78 (1911)).
126 Some authors have argued that individuals have a moral obligation to protect
endangered and threatened species. Holmes Rolston III, Property Rights and
Endangered Species, 61 U. COLO. L. REv. 283, 300 (1990) (stating that the
landowner, not the species, is the newcomer). Few would find any basis for an
argument, however, that species preservation efforts that preclude the most basic




animals. As these heavily protected species continue to come into serious
conflict with adversely impacted property owners, however, these property
owners will resent bearing the heavy burden of regulations aimed at
protecting these species which then grant a benefit upon the public at large.
As the Secretary of Interior continues to exercise his power to designate
critical habitat in the face of increasing development pressures, Congress
and the FWS must confront the prospect of relaxing restrictions against
taking endangered species or finding a way to compensate for the
regulatory takings that are occurring.127
A. Why the ESA Is Unique Among Environmental Statutes
The Lucas Court stated that it expected a complete economic loss to
occur "relatively rarely" or only in "extraordinary circumstances." 128
Because of the unique nature of the ESA among environmental regulation,
however, the Court may be confronted with more takings cases than it
anticipated. Three characteristics of the ESA differentiate the statute from
other regulations. First, species protection does not fall under the
traditional rubric of public nuisance. At common law, an individual owned
not only the real property constituting a parcel of land, but also the
resources contained on that land, including the plant and animal species.
The second distinction presented by the ESA is its nature of rigid
enforcement. Although the use of an ESA section 10(a) permit allows for
incidental takings in occasional cases, 129 a broad definition of harm
disallows virtually any use of property designated as critical habitat.' 30
Unlike wetlands cases in which the property owner may be able to work
around the affected areas, endangered species usually rely on the entire
habitat. Often, none of the property can be disturbed. Under such harsh
restrictions, land must be "left substantially in its natural state." 131 Thus,
the restrictions "carry with them a heightened risk that private property is
being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of
127 The Law That Seemingly Pits Owls Against People and Jobs, Los ANGELES
TIMEs, Jan. 3, 1993, at M4 (stating that changes in environmental laws and ecological
planning are necessary in harsh economic times).
128 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
129 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
130 See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Lujan, 806
F. Supp. 279, 282-85, dismissed without opin., in part, 976 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir.
1992), aff'd., 1 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
131 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
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mitigating serious public harm." 132
Finally, it is likely that a finding of a compensable taking will occur
more often under the ESA because species often are listed after an
individual has bought the impacted property and developed investment-
backed expectations. This last indicia of the ESA creates a vicious cycle.
As development pressures increase, more rural and agricultural land is
being snatched up to satisfy the suburban sprawl. As land is purchased and
modified, species that previously relied on the natural resources are
threatened. Once a decline in any species or subspecies is detected, the
ESA seeks to protect the survival of the plant or animal by halting
development. Thus, once a property owner's legitimate investment-backed
expectations are frustrated and the property experiences a total or almost
total loss of economic value, a valid claim for a compensable taking is
likely to exist. Therefore, these three characteristics of the ESA appear to
make a compensable taking increasingly likely under the ESA.
B. Potential Solutions to the Hard Reality
As courts are faced with the task of discerning the degree of economic
loss suffered by landowners affected by the ESA and the validity of takings
claims, the federal government must find ways to compensate for
regulatory takings. One mechanism in place to satisfy claims against the
U.S. Government is the Tucker Act. 133 Cases involving wetlands takings
have compensated plaintiffs through the Tucker Act. Another system of
compensation used in Wyoming may serve as a model for the federal
government. 134 Unfortunately, any federal compensation system will
require a large amount of federal funds which are difficult to find in these
days of budgetary restraints. Consequently, reforms within the ESA itself
may be crucial to finding a truly realistic solution.
One way to raise funds to set aside critical habitat and compensate
adversely affected property owners is the use of mitigation fees. By
132 Id.
133 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). "The United States Court of
Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department ... ." Id.
134 Wyo. STAT. § 23-1-901 (1991). The statute provides compensation to
landowners whose property is being damaged by "big or trophy game animals or
game birds" of the state. Strict time deadlines are set for reporting the damage, filing
claims, and obtaining judgment. Landowners who are unhappy with the result of their
claim may appeal and pursue the matter in arbitration. Id.
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assessing a fee on each acre planned for development in the affected area,
the cost of preserving species may be spread more evenly.' 35
Several bills introduced in the House of Representatives and Senate
during the last Congress demonstrate the direction that reforms to the ESA
might take. One bill introduced by Senator Symms of Idaho, entitled the
"Progressive Endangered Species Act of 1992," sought to protect
endangered species while recognizing the economic impact of this
protection.' 36 This bill would have encouraged market forces to take part
in species preservation and would have required compensation for takings.
Representative Hansen of Utah introduced a bill, entitled the "Human
Protection Act of 1991," that would have required the benefits of any
action under the ESA, including the listing of species, to outweigh the
costs of that action.137 Finally, Representative Tauzin of Louisiana
introduced a bill, entitled the "Endangered Species Act Reform
Amendments of 1992," that would have left the listing process largely
untouched but would have lightened the restrictions on government actions
imposed by the ESA.138
Another solution which has been suggested advocates large scale
planning and coordination between all interested parties-from
environmental groups to property developers. One year ago, U.S.
Department of Interior Secretary, Bruce Babbitt, proposed such an
ecosystem approach to the protection of the California Gnatcatcher, a small
bird residing in southern California. 139 Secretary Babbitt simultaneously
announced that the Gnatcatcher would be listed as a threatened species
under the ESA and that limited takings of the species would be permitted
under the guidelines of local conservation plans. 140 This unique program
demonstrates an effort to promote "ecosystem-wide" management rather
135 Presently, entities who develop acreage in Riverside County pay $1,950 per
acre. Position Paper, Wildlife Conservation, Property Owners Association of Riverside
County p.3 (Position Paper on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). As of March
1992, the total amount of money raised thus far for the study and protection of the
Stephens' kangaroo rat alone was approximately S26.5 million. Id.
136 H.R. 3159, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see also Nancie G. Marzulla, A
Two-Front Battle for Property Rights, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MoNrroR, Sept. 18, 1992,
at 19.
137 H.R. 3092, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
138 H.R. 6134, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
139 Tom Kenworthy, Babbitt Clears Compromise to Protect California Bird,
WASH. POST, March 26, 1993, at A2; see also U.S. Department of the Interior News
Release (March 25, 1993) (News Release on file with the Ohio State Law Journal)
[hereinafter Interior News Release].
140 Interior News Release at 2.
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than "species-by-species" protection. 141
V. CONCLUSION
The time has come for Congress to recognize the looming problem of
species preservation and devise a way to alleviate the burden on private
property owners. In many cases, mitigation can be a solution;142 however,
when a property owner is affected drastically, that individual should not be
expected to carry the burden of species protection for the general welfare
of the public. Consequently, compensation offers an equitable solution by
balancing the burden levied upon an affected landowner with funds raised
from public sources. Nor does instituting a more balanced approach to
species protection in relation to land uses aid only private landowners-
many economic development and housing projects will also be benefited. 143
As Congress begins the task of reauthorizing the Endangered Species Act,
it should anticipate the legal battles of the future by balancing the rights of
species and property owners. Foresight of this kind will provide the best
management of our country's ecosystems.
The Clinton Administration's Secretary of Interior, Bruce Babbitt, has
proposed a system of species preservation that focuses on the entire
ecosystem. Such a system of protection for entire ecosystems instead of
specific species, could protect numerous animal and plant species in the
short term, well before they are in danger of extinction. Such an approach
could also provide advance notice to property owners before irreparable
harm occurs. This fresh approach to the ESA likely will alleviate future
battles between animal species and species of the human kind.
141 Id.
142 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
143 Arnold, supra note 23.
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